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We introduce a minimum wage and severance payments in an equilibrium 
labor market model with search frictions. We analyze how these policies 
affect endogenous job creation and destruction decisions and, more 
generally, the general equilibrium allocation. We structurally estimate the 
model's parameters and, with the resulting sets of estimates, we perform a 
quantitative welfare analysis. We conclude that when the dispersion in 
wages found in the sample is low and the share that workers receive from 
the surplus their job generates is below a particular level, the maximum 
level of welfare can be attained using either any of the two policies by 
themselves or an appropriate combination. However, as dispersion in 
wages increases, the minimum wage, by itself, can no longer reach the 
economy's maximum level of welfare; and when it is high enough, no 
policy in isolation can attain the economy's maximum level of welfare, a 
combination is required. 
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 31 Introduction
A country's economic development and the well-being of its population are inuenced by its
labor market performance. The performance of the labor market and the policies that regu-
late it are tightly linked. We theoretically and empirically study the positive and normative
equilibrium implications of the interaction of severance payments and minimum wage. These
two policies are found together in many countries,1 yet the analysis of their interaction has
not received much attention. We formulate and structurally estimate an equilibrium search-
and-matching model of an economy where these two policies coexist, and use the estimates
of the model's parameters to perform counterfactual experiments.
To this purpose, our model must have two basic ingredients. Firstly, labor market policies
may have an impact on all individuals in the model, not only on those that are directly
aected. For example, a minimum wage may change the outside option for all workers,
thus aecting the entire wage distribution. Therefore, it is essential to cast the analysis in
general equilibrium. Secondly, we should be able to analyze the impact of policies on all
rms' decisions, that is, job creation and destruction. Prat (forthcoming) meets these two
requirements, creating a framework particularly suited for estimation and the performance
of welfare analysis.
Prat (forthcoming) develops a continuous-time equilibrium model of the labor market
with search frictions and Nash bargaining in a stationary environment. Ex-ante homoge-
nous workers and rms make contact according to a standard matching technology. Upon
contact, they draw their match-specic productivity, a dimension of initial heterogeneity that
generates a job creation decision. After the initial draw, productivity uctuates stochasti-
cally, a source of ex-post heterogeneity that introduces an endogenous destruction decision
in the model. We extend this framework in two directions. First, we allow for two possible
large shocks leading to exogenous match destruction; one of the two entitles the worker to
receive severance payments. Second, wages cannot be lower than a mandatory, exogenously
set, minimum wage.
Parametric assumptions on the distribution of initial productivity and on its stochastic
evolution permit us to explicitly derive the likelihood of the model. We estimate the model
using data from Chile, which is an interesting case because a large proportion of the Chilean
population earns the minimum wage and severance payments are high by international stan-
dards.
We nd that the model implies a good t of our data, the general shapes of the wage and
employment duration distributions are captured. We then perform counterfactual experi-
ments that allow us to answer questions about optimal policy combinations. Hosios (1990)
1Refer for example to the Employment Outlook, OECD (2004).
3showed that in a search model where homogenous rms and workers meet according to a
CRS matching function, and where wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining, e-
ciency is met if the share that workers receive of the match surplus is equal to the elasticity
of the matching function, with respect to the size of the set of the unemployed. If the share
of workers is too low, labor market policies can increase the \eective" worker bargaining
power and improve aggregate welfare. Pissarides (2000) extends Hosios' result to models
with endogenous creation and to models with endogenous destruction where productivity
jumps after being hit by a shock. In our setting, the productivity distribution of active
matches is an evolving state variable of the centralized optimization problem, thus, we are
not able to solve it analytically nor numerically.2 Instead, armed with the estimated model,
we perform a quantitative analysis of the steady state welfare eects of severance payments
and the minimum wage. Note that if there were no discounting in the model, comparisons
of steady state welfare would allow us to assess whether Hosios holds in our setting or not.
However, with a positive discount rate, to evaluate Hosios' result we should also consider
welfare during the transitional path between the corresponding steady states. Given the
described technical diculty in solving the planner's dynamic optimization problem, it will
be subject of future research, and here we present an analysis of steady state welfare.
Our data do not allow to identify and estimate two critical parameters, the worker bar-
gaining share and the elasticity of the matching function. Hence, we perform our analysis
for xed values of these two parameters.
We nd that in equilibrium, a binding minimum wage aects the whole wage distribution,
but it has a relatively larger impact at the bottom of the distribution. Therefore, small
changes in the minimum wage have a large impact on the job creation and destruction
threshold, but their impact on labor demand and market tightness is modest. On the other
hand, severance payments aect the whole wage distribution, and all workers are equally
eligible to receive an amount that is increasing in the wage. This behavior makes the level of
wage dispersion of the sample a critical factor in determining the optimal policy menu. When
the dispersion in wages is low and the share that workers receive from the surplus their job
generates equals the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the size of the set of
unemployed, the economy's maximum welfare level is reached in a policy-free environment;
on the other hand, if the workers' share is below the elasticity, the maximum level of welfare
can be attained using any of the following three possibilities: severance payments or a
minimum wage by themselves or with an appropriate combination of these two policies. In
all these cases, it is optimal to create almost all matches, and any creation threshold that
accumulates almost no initial draws is enough (with the appropriate market tightness, of
2These kind of problems suer of the dimensionality curse.
4course). However, when productivity rises, for a signicant fraction of matches it is optimal
that rms keep looking for better draws instead of producing. In this way, as dispersion
in wages increases, so that the productivity threshold leaves some matches uncreated but
most turn to production, the strong eect of the minimum wage at the bottom of the wage
distribution makes it impossible to attain the ecient job creation cuto, and thus it can
not implement the economy's maximum level of welfare, whereas severance payments are
still capable of reaching such maximum by themselves. Even more, when the dispersion in
wages is high enough, for any level of the workers' share, no policy in isolation can attain the
economy's maximum level of welfare and a particular combination of labor market policies
is required (the impact of severance payments is no longer enough to reach the necessary
high productivity threshold, thus a minimum wage is needed too).
In the related literature, authors studying the impact of employment protection policies
have focused primarily on its tax dimension. Indeed, when wages are exible, Lazear (1990)
showed that the wage of newly recruited workers was reduced in an amount equal to the
expected value of the future severance payments transfer. Therefore, in such settings, sever-
ance payments have no eect on the equilibrium allocation. One of the exceptions closer to
our model is Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999). They also studied the interaction of severance
payments and minimum wage in a search model; however their characterization of wage pro-
les is dierent to ours. As shown by Garibaldi and Violante (2005), dierences in the wage
setting mechanisms are essential in determining the eects of severance payments. In Cahuc
and Zylberberg (1999), the wage of entrants is reduced because of severance payments. In
addition, they assume that workers cannot observe the productivity of the match, and thus,
wage renegotiations only take place by mutual agreement. This implies that, in equilibrium,
renegotiations are started by employers, and only when the idiosyncratic productivity shock
is so bad that they have a credible threat to destroy the match. This characterization leads
to wages that can only decrease with tenure. Cahuc and Zylberberg conclude that severance
payments have a real impact on the labor market (in particular on employment, there is no
thorough welfare analysis) when the minimum wage is high. Whereas in our setting, where
all workers face the same wage negotiation mechanism and wages can increase with tenure,
severance payments can have a signicant impact on employment and, more importantly, on
welfare even in the absence of a binding minimum wage.
Closer to our analysis in terms of structure (modeling of labor market policy, estimation
and welfare analysis) is Flinn (2006). He introduces a minimum wage in a search model
with wages determined through Nash bargain, stochastic job matching and endogenous par-
ticipation. Hosios' result does hold in his model, and, as in our model, a binding minimum
5wage can increase welfare by increasing the eective bargaining power of workers.3 Minimum
wages, however, can have a potentially larger impact on welfare in Flinn's setting, because
they have the additional benet of increasing participation.4 Finally, as only exogenous
destruction exists in Flinn's model, it is not the best alternative to study the impact of
severance payments.
In Section 2 we present some stylized facts about the Chilean labor market and Chilean
legal framework, to motivate the specication of policies in our model. The model is pre-
sented in Section 3 and a sample of its likelihood derivation is shown in Section 4, a complete
likelihood derivation can be found in the Appendix. In Section 5 we describe our data, discuss
identication, present our estimation results and briey describe some sensitivity analysis.
Our welfare analysis is presented in Section 6 and we conclude in Section 7.
2 Stylized Facts
In this section we present stylized facts about the Chilean labor market and Chilean legal
framework, to motivate the specication of policies in our model.
The mandatory minimum wage applies to all private sector workers between the ages
of 18 and 65.5 The minimum wage is modied every July by Congress, based on expected
ination and productivity. Severance payments are due to workers with an indenite contract
who are red because of rm's necessities (necesidades de la empresa). Layos because of
changes in demand or in the economy or rm modernization fall in this category. The law
starts binding after 12 months of tenure and the worker is eligible for a severance payment
of one month of wages for each year worked at the rm, up to an upper bound of 11 years.
The base to compute the monthly wage is the last wage received by the worker.6
To assess the impact of severance payments and the minimum wage on the Chilean la-
bor market, we present some descriptive statistics of our data. Note that a more detailed
description of our data and the subsamples we use in the estimation is presented in Section
5. We draw our longitudinal data from the Social Protection Survey. Our panel data set
contains individual's labor market histories since 1990, with information on wages, spell du-
3Pissarides (2000) extends Hosios' results to settings with endogenous participation and where initial
productivity is drawn from a distribution and remains constant through out the match life.
4In Flinn's model, participation increases when the value of unemployment increases. Therefore, given
that in our model severance payments are more eective than the minimum wage in increasing the value of
unemployment, the introduction of the participation decision in our model could make policies more eective
in taking the economy to its ecient level, but it would not change the result of severance payments being
more eective.
5The mandatory minimum wage for workers outside this age range is 25% lower.
6Severance payments rules have been modied through the years. The ones described here apply since
1990.
6Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Characteristic All Education 1 Education 2 Education 3
Spells 14650 3062 8800 2708
Individuals 8131 1947 4703 1481
Ratio (av. wage/ 4.74 2.94 4.07 8.43
min. wage) (5.84) (2.16) (3.88) (10.08)
Av. employment 43.99 45.66 42.94 45.72
duration (42.85) (44.13) (41.95) (44.51)
Av. unemployment 10.55 10.39 10.62 10.63
duration (15.51) (15.21) (16.13) (13.36)
Receive SP 46.4% 41.0% 48.6% 44.5%
Earn min. wage 17.0% 20.2% 13.0% 5.2%
Standard deviations in parenthesis. Source: Social Protection Survey.
rations, and reception of severance payments for completed employment spells. Our sample
consists of almost 15000 censored and completed spells belonging to 8131 individuals. Ta-
ble 1 presents some descriptive statistics for our pooled sample and for each of the three
subsamples we use in the estimation process: low education workers (Education 1), which
is composed of workers with eight years of school or less; high school education workers
(Education 2); and those with a college degree or more (Education 3).
Employment spells were found to last, on average, almost 44 months, whereas the average
unemployment spell length was 10.6 months, and none of these averages vary signicantly
across education groups. 46 percent of the completed employment spells ended with the
reception of severance payments, this proportion changing across education groups, however
being always over 40 percent. A mass of almost 17 percent of employees earns the minimum
wage and, consistent with lower education workers earning lower average wages, this mass
decreases rapidly when education increases, from 20 percent for workers with the lowest
education, to 13 percent for those that nished high-school and ve percent for those with
graduate studies. Therefore, across all education groups, we nd a large mass earning the
minimum wage and more than 40 percent of the employees receiving severance payments.
An interesting feature of severance payments found in our data is shown in Table 2: the
proportion of completed employment spells that end with severance payments increases with
the wage. When dividing the sample by education level, this relationship was found to be
valid in all groups (with the proportion increasing at dierent rates though) except for those
7Table 2: Wages and Incidence of Severance Payments
Normalized % of Spells Ending with SP
Hourly Wage w Full Sample Education 1 Education 2 Education 3
w  1:1 37.3 37.5 37.2 37.7
1:1 < w < 1:6 42.0 35.2 44.0 43.5
1:6  w < 3:3 39.7 28.6 41.7 42.7
3:3  w < 5:1 52.2 41.3 58.2 48.9
w  5:1 58.0 46.9 59.9 59.4
Each wage bracket contains approximately 20% of the sample. Source: Social Protection Survey.
Table 3: Tenure and Incidence of Severance Payments
Tenure % of Spells Ending with SP
T (in months) Full Sample Education 1 Education 2 Education 3
12  T  17 42.4 39.6 44.8 39.7
18  T  26 46.5 51.1 49.0 46.1
27  T  38 47.9 35.9 49.1 53.4
39  T  60 51.8 43.4 55.2 51.1
T  61 52.3 43.0 55.5 54.9
Tenure is the length of completed employment spells. Each tenure bracket
contains approximately 20% of the sample. Source: Social Protection Survey.
8in the lowest education bracket (eight years of school or less). This relationship will help us
specify severance payments in the model presented in Section 3. We assume that severance
payments are proportional to productivity, which in the model is proportional to wages,
since in our model productivity is also positively correlated with tenure, for the sake of the
model's t to the data, we should expect to nd in our data a positive relationship between
the incidence of severance payments and tenure too. We do in fact nd such relationship
(the results are presented in Table 3), the incidence of severance payments and tenure are
positively correlated as well, validating our severance payments specication.
3 Model
The model is set in continuous time and we assume a stationary labor market environment.
The market is populated by a measure one of workers that are either employed or unemployed
and searching for a job. There is a continuum of rms that can produce and search for
workers to ll vacancies. Workers and rms meet according to a CRS matching technology,
and produce a homogeneous good in matches formed by one rm and one worker. Their
match-specic initial productivity is drawn from a distribution G. After observing the initial
draw, they decide whether to start producing. If they resolve not to produce, the worker
remains in the unemployment state and the rm maintains its vacancy. Otherwise, the job
is created and production starts. In active matches, idiosyncratic productivity stochastically
uctuates according to a geometric Brownian motion with parameters  and . Therefore,
the law of motion of productivity x is given by
dxt
xt
= dt + dBt
where dBt is the increment of a Wiener process.
Firms and workers are risk-neutral. Given the value of unemployment, workers maximize
the expected present discounted value of wages. Similarly, given the value of a vacancy,
rms maximize the expected present discounted value of prot ow. Wages are continuously
renegotiated via Nash bargaining, where the worker's net return from the relationship is
equal to a fraction  of the total surplus of the match. Firms and workers use the same
discount rate r.
We use the stylized facts presented in Section 2 to specify severance payments and the
minimum wage. We assume wages cannot be lower than a statutory, exogenously set, mini-
mum wage m. To mimic severance payment law, we would have to introduce a trial period
where the severance payment is not binding and model severance payments as proportional
to the last wage, with the proportionality coecient equal to the minimum between tenure
9and 11 years of employment. This immensely complicates the derivation of the model's
likelihood function. Therefore, we implement an approximation to the Chilean setting by
modeling severance payments as proportional to the productivity the job had at the time
of the break. As wages are proportional to productivity in our model, this specication
captures the relationship between the severance payments and wages. Specically, we model
severance payments as a fraction  of the workers' nal productivity. Because in Chile sever-
ance payments are paid only when the worker is red due to rm's necessities, at any given
nal wage we will nd spells that ended both with and without severance payments; this is
conrmed by the numbers in Table 2. Based on this, we introduce two exogenous shocks,
one that entitles the worker to receive severance payments, while the other does not. We
assume these shocks have Poisson arrival rates 1 and 2 respectively. In the equilibrium
of our model, matches with productivity below a certain threshold will be endogenously
destroyed. We also assume that rms do not have to pay severance in such circumstance.
Finally, as we do not dierentiate sectors or contract types in our model, the same
severance payments rules apply to all workers.7
3.1 Bellman Equations
Two equilibrium cutos for productivity will naturally arise in this setting. First, rms opti-
mally choose a threshold xr, such that if the initial productivity draw is below it, the match
is not created. As we are assuming that no severance payments are due when the match
is endogenously terminated, destruction is determined by the same threshold as creation.8
Given a wage schedule, rms will create/maintain a job as long as the present discounted
value of its net return is equal to the value of posting a vacancy. Let xm be the level of
productivity for which the wage implied by the Nash bargaining is equal to the minimum
wage m. If xm is larger than the creation/destruction cuto xr, then the minimum wage is
binding, and the mass of people earning the minimum wage is comprised of workers employed
with productivities between xr and xm.
The relationship between wages and productivity implies that the value functions of
workers and rms are dened piecewise. Let wNB(x) be the wage dened in the Nash
7Therefore, in the estimation we only use information on employment spells in the private sector with
indenite contracts.
8The assumption that severance payments are not mandatory in case of endogenous destruction is made
to guarantee that our model is consistent with the fact that the proportion of completed employment spells
that end with severance payments increases with the wage. In fact, let xr be the productivity cuto, then the
chance of receiving severance payments conditional on separation in the next instant and given a productivity
xT t in T   t, is given by
1
1 + 2 + PfxT = xrjxT tg
which is increasing in xT t and, as we will prove, in our model wages are increasing in productivity.
10bargaining when productivity is equal to x. Therefore, the general wage function w(x) can
be dened as:
w(x) = m + Ifxxmg(wNB(x)   m) 8x  xr
where IfAg is the indicator function of the subset A.
Hence, given the value of unemployment U and the value V of a vacancy, the value
functions of workers (W) and rms (J) are dened piecewise as:
K(x) =
(
Km(x) x 2 [xr;xm)
KNB(x) x  xm
for K 2 fW;Jg
Where:
rWi(x) = w(x) + (1 + 2)(U   Wi(x)) + 1x +
E[dWi(x)]
dt
i 2 fm;NBg (1)
and
rJi(x) = x   w(x) + (1 + 2)(V   Ji(x))   1x +
E[dJi(x)]
dt
i 2 fm;NBg (2)
Equation (1) represents an asset equation in a perfect capital market. Wm(x) is the
asset value of a worker matched to a job with productivity x 2 (xr;xm). Consequently,
its capital cost, rWm(x), must equal its return. The return components include: the ow
value of a wage, in this case equal to the minimum wage, the net return of changing state,
U  Wm(x), which happens according to a Poisson process of rate (1 +2), the return from
receiving severance payments x after a 1 shock and the return from expected changes in
the valuation of the asset. WNB(x) has exactly the same interpretation, the only dierence
in its formulation is that the relevant wage is the one determined using Nash bargaining, not
the minimum wage.
The intuition of the rm's value function J in (2) follows that of the worker's. The rm's
ow value is the output less the pay to the worker. If a destruction shock arrives, the rm
will have a vacancy of value V . If 1 hits, then the rm has to pay severance payments to
the worker.
3.2 Wage Determination
We assume that if the worker and the rm cannot reach an agreement in their wage renegoti-
ation, then the rm must provide a severance payment to the worker. In this way, severance
payments will be considered in the threat points of the workers and the rms.9 The Nash
9We are assuming that in case of disagreement severance payments must be paid, but Nash bargaining
is an axiomatic, cooperative solution. Binmore et al. (1986) show that the Nash bargaining solution can be
11bargained wage is the solution of the following maximization problem:
max(W   U   x)
(J   V + x)
1 
whose rst order condition is:
WNB(x)   (U + x) = [WNB(x) + JNB(x)   V   U] (3)
Equation (3) states that the worker's net return from the relationship is equal to a fraction
 of the total surplus of the match. We will refer to  as the workers' bargaining power. We
use WNB and JNB because this negotiation is relevant only when productivity is larger than
xm.
The amount of vacancies in the market is determined according to a free-entry condition,
that is, vacancies are created until discounted prots equal the cost of entry. Thus, the value
of vacancies, V , is equal to zero.
Applying equations (1) through (3), and the free-entry condition, we derive the following
expression for wages when x  xm:
wNB(x) = rU + (x   rU) + x(r + 2   ) (4)
The rst two terms are common in Nash bargaining. The worker receives his outside
option, rU, plus a fraction  of the net surplus that the match creates, x   rU. The third
term is the positive eect of severance payments on wages. This term can be decomposed in
two eects: if we had not included severance payments in the threat points, and therefore
severance payments had only had an eect through the value functions, the third term would
just be  1x, and thus workers would pre-pay the severance payments they may receive at
the end of the job. Now, when considering severance payments in the wage negotiation, we
also have to add x(r+1 +2  ). That is, each period the worker receives interest for his
future holdings of severance payments, where the relevant rate is the market's interest rate
adjusted for the probability of match destruction and the drift in productivity. The sum of
these two terms is the last term of the wage in equation (4).
obtained as the limit of the sequential equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. They analyze an alternating
oer game with risk of breakdown in between rounds of oers, in which agents receive exogenously set
payos in the event of a breakdown. They prove that as the time interval between rounds goes to zero, the
equilibrium implies an immediate agreement and the resulting split is analogous to that of a Nash bargaining
solution where the threat points are the exogenous payos of the agents. This game is consistent with our
setting if a breakdown of real time negotiations is caused by a shock arriving at rate 1, which prevents
the rm from returning to the bargaining table (and therefore oblige it to pay severance). In this case, the
exogenous payos of the agents are V   x and U + x for the rm and the worker, respectively.
123.3 Solution of Value Functions
The assumption of a geometric Brownian motion for the productivity process, together with









i (x) + xK
0
i(x) for i 2 fm;NBg and K 2 fW;Jg
Given this result and the expression for the wage in equation (4), we solve the dierential





































where A;B;C;D;E;F;G and H are unknown scalars,  = 1 + 2, and fR1;R2g are the
roots of the characteristic equation
2
2
z(z   1) + z   (r + ) = 0 with R1 < 0 < R2:
The last two terms of Wm in (5) represent the expected present value of producing when
the level of productivity x is in [xr;xm) forever. The worker receives a ow wage m, each
instant there is a probability  of becoming unemployed and receiving U, and each instant
there is a probability 1 of receiving severance payments x. Notice that the eective discount
rate for terms not involving productivity is the one usually found when there are Poisson
processes involved; that is, the risk free rate plus the destruction rate. For terms involving
productivity, the eective discount rate takes into consideration that the expected value of
productivity exponentially grows according to the drift , which must then be subtracted.
Finally, given that the last two terms of Wm represent the value of producing forever in the
region [xr;xm), the rst two terms must embody the option value to separate plus the value
of going into the region where the minimum wage stops binding.
The interpretation of WNB is similar. The last four terms represent the expected present
discounted value of the revenue stream when the initial productivity is x. At each instant,
the worker receives a fraction  of the net return that he generates in the match, x   rU;
Nash bargaining wages also add the ows rU and x(r+2 ). Finally, we have to include
13U from the probability of turning unemployed and 1x from the probability of getting
severance payments. The expected present value of the sum of these four terms, using the
appropriate discount rate for each of them, are the last two terms in WNB, U plus x. As
before the rst two terms of WNB represent the value of going into the region [xr;xm).
These equations imply that we must determine 10 parameters: eight coecients plus the
two productivity cutos. As the last four terms of WNB represent the expected present value
of producing forever given an initial productivity in the region [xm;1), the rst two terms
represent the value of the option to separate. As productivity increases, the probability of
crossing the cuto xr goes to zero, and then so should the value of the option to separate.
When productivity goes to innity, xR1 goes to zero but xR2 diverges. Thus, for this solution
to have a valid economic meaning, we need D to be zero. Applying this analysis to the value
of the rm, we conclude that H will also need to equal zero.
By denition, xm is the productivity at which Nash bargaining implies a wage equal to
the minimum wage. Thus, from equation (4):
xm =
m   (1   )rU
 + (r + 2   )
(9)
Therefore, we need six restrictions to determine the remaining coecients, plus one
additional equation for xr, resulting in seven needed restrictions.
At xr rms are indierent between creating (destroying) the match and remaining (going)
idle. Additionally, rm's optimality requires a smooth pasting condition at xr. These two
conditions together imply:
Jm(xr) = 0 and J
0
m(xr) = 0 (10)
Furthermore, we have three value matching conditions. The rm's and worker's value of
producing at xm must be the same whether we approach xm from the left or the right; and
the value of the worker at the destruction cuto must be equal to the unemployment value.
Thus, we have that:
Jm(xm) = JNB(xm) (11)
Wm(xm) = WNB(xm) (12)
Wm(xr) = U (13)











Equations (9) through (15) form an implicit system for the value function coecients
and the two cutos, as function of the model parameters and the equilibrium value of un-
employment U. We determine formulas for each of the unknowns as functions of the model
parameters, xr and U. In particular, the conditions on the value of a rm imply an implicit
equation for the threshold xr that will be useful when performing counterfactual experiments.






3.4 Closing the Model
To complete the model, we describe how workers and rms meet and derive the equilibrium
equations for the value of unemployment and the value of a vacancy.
As is common in this strand of literature, we assume a constant returns to scale matching
technology M. This matching function depends upon the unemployment and vacancy rates
and determines the number of matches per unit of time in the economy. The CRS assumption




;1)  vq() with  =
v
u
Thus, the contact rate per vacancy M(u;v)=v is given by q(); and the contact rate per
unemployed worker M(u;v)=u is equal to q().
The value of unemployment U is described by:
rU =  s + q()
Z xm
xr






where s is the cost to the worker of exerting search eort. The standard asset interpretation
follows, with the RHS of equation (17) representing the net return from searching; this is,
the expected net return of making contact with a worker less search costs. The equation for
10Given that the wage schedule is continuous but not smooth, this result is not direct. We generalized
this result from the discrete case. We discretized the model, where no boundary conditions are needed, and
obtained a numerical approximation of the value functions using the iteration method. The value functions
that resulted were smooth as the discretization was made very ne.











With these elements we are ready to close the model and formally dene equilibrium.
Denition: Given a minimum wage m and a severance payment coecient , an equi-
librium is a collection fW;J;U;xr;xm;g, where the value functions W and J, the value of
unemployment U, the productivity thresholds fxr;xmg and the market tightness  satisfy
the conditions (5) through (15), (17) and (18).
4 Likelihood
The selection method we use to build our sample, which is explained with detail in Section 5,
implies that the proportions we nd in our data of workers in the employed and unemployed
states do not properly represent the real values of such fractions. Since we can not extract
valid information from the observed fraction of workers in each labor market state, we decided
to implement a maximum likelihood procedure conditional on such states.
Following Prat (forthcoming), we assume a Lognormal distribution for the distribution
G of initial draws, for two reasons. First, Lognormal distributions are recoverable in the
sense of Heckman and Flinn (1982), that is, its parameters are identied. Second, the as-
sumption of a Lognormal sampling distribution, together with the assumption of a geometric
Brownian motion for the productivity process, allows us to derive explicit expressions for
equilibrium unemployment and the ergodic distribution of productivity, as wells as the like-
lihood contribution of each of the spell types. This includes two types of unemployment
spells, censored and completed spells. In the data, there are three types of censored em-
ployment spells: those with a wage equal to the minimum wage, those with a wage larger
than the minimum and those without wage information. Uncensored employment spells can
contain information on wages and on the reception of severance payments; there are three
possibilities for wages w, fw = m;w > m;no information on wg, and three possibilities for
severance payments, freceived SP, did not receive SP, no information about SPg. Thus, nine
dierent contributions from completed employment spells result.
For each type of spell we compute its density conditional on the labor market state, or
joint conditional density in the cases where, in addition to spell length, we have information
on wages or on the reception of severance payments. We present here the basic steps of the
derivation of the conditional likelihood contribution of a completed employment spell with
wage information and that end with the reception of severance payments. More detailed
16calculations for this type of spell, and for all other types of spells, can be found in the
Appendix.
First, we must provide some denitions:
Ti = time of arrival of the rst exogenous shock i, i = 1;2. Let fi be its pdf, and Fi its cdf.
Tr = minft > 0jXt = xrg, time of endogenous separation. Let fr be its pdf, and Fr its cdf.
te = minfT1;T2;Trg, that is, duration of completed employment spells.
By assumption
fi(t) = ie
 it and Fi(t) = 1   e
 it i = 1;2
The following generalization of the reection principle is going to be useful,11 for x0  xr:
P(Tr  t;Xt 2 dx) =
8
> > > <




























dx x < xr
where  is the standard Normal density function and   =    2
2 . This implies:









































We rst compute the joint density of te and productivity, and then use the change of variable
formula to derive the formula for wages.
For  x  xr
P(te  t;Xte   x; SP paid) =
Z t
0
P(Xs   x;s < Tr)[1   F2(s)]dF1(s)
Then, we dierentiate this probability with respect to  x and t to derive the density d for
11See Harrison (1985) for details on its derivation.
17 x  xr. Using equation (19) we obtain:






























Let the term in squared brackets be A(t;  x). Using this denition, and the change of variable
formula, the joint density of a completed spell of length t, with wage w, and that ended up
with severance payments is:





+(r+2 ) w > m
 F2(t)f1(t)
R xr
xm A(t;x)dx w = m
where x(w) = (w   (1   )rU)=( + (r + 2   )) is the productivity implied by wage w.
The density h is the likelihood contribution of this spell, conditional on the initial draw.12
To derive the nal expression of the likelihood contribution, we take the average over x0,
which is distributed according to a Lognormal distribution truncated at xr. However, we
omit this long nal calculation.
5 Estimation
5.1 Data
To estimate the model parameters we use data from the Chilean Social Protection Survey
(Encuesta de Protecci on Social, EPS hereafter). It is a panel household survey implemented
by the Micro-data Center of the Department of Economics of the Universidad de Chile. It
was rst conducted in 2002 and continued every two years thereafter. For this study, we use
the 2002, 2004 and 2006 rounds. As the EPS was created as a tool to study the behavior
of individuals aliated with the pension system, the 2002 EPS is representative of that
universe.13 Since 2004, the universe of the EPS was expanded to make it representative of
the entire Chilean population aged 18 and over.
EPS data includes socio-demographic information as well as past and current labor mar-
ket information. When individuals are interviewed for the rst time, they are asked about
their labor market activities since 1980, or since they were 15, whichever occurred last.
12To be precise, the density h is the conditional likelihood contribution of this spell, however, hereafter I
will omit the conditional.
13In 2002 around 80% of the population aged 15 and over was aliated to the pension system.
18Individuals that were interviewed in previous rounds were asked about their labor market
activities since the last time they were surveyed. Each activity must be labeled as employed,
unemployed, looking for a job for the rst time or inactive; they were also asked to provide
the initial and nal month and year for every spell.
The information specically relevant to this study includes the duration of spells, monthly
wages, hours worked monthly, reception of severance payments and type of job. Given the
structure of the survey, we obtained information on the monthly duration of every activity.
The question about wages changed after the rst round of the survey; in 2002, currently
employed individuals were asked about their wages in the last month, but there was no wage
question for past employment spells. Starting in 2004, only the average wage is asked for
current and past employment spells. For each completed employment spell, individuals were
asked whether they received severance payments at the end of the spell, but not the specic
amount. Employment spells are classied by sector and contract type. As only private sector
workers with an indenite contract are eligible to receive severance payments, we only use
in our sample employment spells corresponding to that type of jobs. Finally, we discarded
spells corresponding to workers younger than 18 years old or older than 65 years old, as they
are not eligible to receive the minimum wage.
Four issues arise with this dataset. First, we decided to use average wages as if they were
current wages for censored employment spells and last wage for completed spells. We do this
for technical reasons; in particular, the joint density of average wages over an employment
spell and spell length is not easy to derive analytically in our setting. To test this assumption,
we followed current employment spells in 2002 EPS to 2004 EPS and compared the current
wage reported in 2002 with their corresponding average wage given in 2004. Almost all 2004
average real wages were signicantly higher than their respective 2002 current wage. This
result could be attributed to rising wages, however, given that we are looking only at a two
year period and that the increase is in general substantial, this result suggests that people
tend to report their last wage when asked about average wages. This gives support to our
assumption.
Second, those who classied themselves as currently unemployed were asked for how
long they have been searching for a job. It was common for people to say that they were
unemployed but not searching. As an unemployed worker in our model is dened as someone
searching, we decided to only include in the sample those spells in which the individual
declared to be searching in some round of the survey. Even though this implies not using
all information available, this strategy resulted in enough unemployment spells as to deliver
a precise estimate of the contact rate. As we are not choosing the spells related to any
individual characteristic, this should not introduce any selection bias.
As a result, our sample disposition implies that the fraction of employed and unemployed
19workers are not representative of such fractions in the Chilean labor market. We use only
selected completed unemployment spells, and employment spells (censored and completed)
corresponding to jobs in the private sector with an indenite contract. Therefore the propor-
tions we nd in our data of workers in the employed and unemployed states do not properly
represent the real values of such fractions. Since we can not extract valid information from
the observed fraction of workers in each labor market state, we decided to implement a
maximum likelihood procedure conditional on such states.
Third, we further restricted our sample to spells that started on or after 1990. Until 1989
Chile was under a military dictatorship with very dierent labor market institutions.14
Fourth, as we do not have direct information on hourly wages, we construct our wage
measure dividing total earnings by the number of hours worked. To deal with a potential
measurement error problem, we assume that the observed wage is equal to the true wage
multiplied by a Lognormal error term, with mean one and variance ME. However, we
assume that the minimum wage is a \focal" point and therefore easy to report correctly,
thus, we treat minimum wage observations as accurate.
This leaves us with a sample that comprises 17 years, each year with a dierent minimum
wage. As ours is a steady state equilibrium, to estimate the model we rescale wages every
year, so that the rescaled minimum wages and average wages are the same for all years in
the sample. When using this sample to estimate our steady state equilibrium model, we are
therefore assuming that changes in the minimum wage were expected and that the economy
converged rapidly to its steady state after each change. Figure 1 represents the ratio between
the minimum wage and the average wage for the Chilean economy. The ratio is fairly stable
prior to 1997 and after 2000. We see an increase in the ratio from 1998 to 2000, caused by the
inability of legislators to adjust minimum wages in the face of the Asian crisis.15 Therefore,
we have a fairly stable environment with an exogenous shock in 1998. We further discuss
this issue in Section 6.5.
There are two dimensions of our panel data set that we are not currently exploiting.
First, there are employment spells with wage information at more than one point in time, and
clearly using all these wages would help in the identication of the productivity process. Since
using all the information available for each spell would greatly complicate the derivation of an
already cumbersome likelihood function, currently we only use the most recent information
for each spell and discard the previous information. Second, we assume that there is no
unobserved heterogeneity. We plan to relax this assumption in the future, exploiting the
multiple spells observed for half of the individuals in our sample. Introducing these two
14See Mizala (1998) for more information on changes in labor market regulation from 1975 to 1995.
15The minimum wage is usually reset every July. However, in 1998 Congress decided to set the minimum
wage for the following three years, at an average annual rate of 11.9%
20Figure 1: Chilean labor market 1993-2007: ratio of minimum wage to average wage.
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE).
extensions would make the estimation of the model much harder than it already is, in terms
of algebra, as well as computational burden. It is in our research agenda.
5.2 Subsamples
It is well known that the level of education of individuals greatly aects the labor market
outcomes. As we do not model this kind of heterogeneity directly, we divide our sample
in three education levels, and we perform the estimation and welfare analysis for each of
these subsamples, assuming separate labor markets for each. The lowest education group,
Education 1 is composed of individuals with at most eight years of schooling; Education
2 includes those that nished high school; and those with higher education are grouped in
Education 3.
5.3 Identication
Parameters that appear directly in the log likelihood formula and that we are able to con-
sistently estimate given our data, are the job contact rate , the rates of the destruction
shocks 1 and 2, the location () and scale () parameters of the distribution of initial
productivity draws, the productivity process parameters  and , and the variance ME of
measurement error. Since the average length of unemployment spells in our model is given by
1=((1 G(xr))), the information on the length of unemployment spells in our data is critical
in the identication of . The proportion found in the data of spells ending with a severance
payment helps determine the relative values of 1 and 2, whereas the length of employment
21spells determines their levels. ML uses wage information to identify the parameters from
the sampling distribution, the productivity process and measurement error.16 For example,
the correlation between wages and tenure found in the data helps determine whether wage
variance should come from the initial sampling distribution or from the productivity process'
dispersion.
The search cost s is not identied, because it only enters the likelihood as a part of the
equation that determines the value of unemployment U. Thus, as is usual in this literature,
we treat the endogenous threshold xr as a parameter in the estimation process and infer
s from the equilibrium equation for U. The workers' bargaining power  also appears in
the likelihood function. Even though in theory it is identied, Flinn (2006) shows that, in
practice, a very large sample would be needed. Thus, we x the value for . The discount
rate r is also unidentied. The rest of the parameters accommodate such that for any value
of r, the log likelihood converges to the same maximum; therefore, we x it as well.
The severance payments coecient  is not identied. The frequency of severance pay-
ments obtained from the survey, allows us to identify the destruction shocks, but as we do
not have information on the amount actually paid, it does not come as a surprise that we
cannot identify . Based on Chilean law, if we know the length of a past employment spell
that ended with severance payments, then we know how many months of wages the worker
must have received as severance payments: the minimum of 11 (ceiling for severance pay-
ments) and the number of years he or she worked for the rm. Therefore, using duration
data, we can compute the average ratio data between severance payments and nal wage for
all past employment spells that ended with a severance payment. The theoretical counter






   reception of SP

where  = (;1;2;xr;;;;;ME) is the collection of the parameters we estimate using
ML. We introduce the restriction model() = data in the estimation. For any given , this
restriction determines a particular level for the severance payments coecient , allowing
us to estimate  using a concentrated likelihood. Once we determine the collection ^  that
maximizes the likelihood, we determine its standard errors with the usual formulas, and then
compute the standard errors of the implied ^  using the delta method.
If information on vacancies were available, we could estimate one parameter of the match-
ing technology q. Given the lack of such information, we will assume a functional form for q
without unknown parameters. With this assumption, together with the free entry condition,
16Remember that one of the reasons to choose a Lognormal distribution for the sampling distribution is
that it is recoverable in the sense of Heckman and Flinn (1982), that is, its parameters are identied.
22we can \back up" the vacancy cost c, which will be necessary for the policy experiments.
The resulting value of c depends upon the elasticity of the chosen matching function. Thus,
in principle, the elasticity could be chosen so that the expected cost of hiring an employee,
measured in units of monthly wages, is consistent with any desired number. We can derive











As we directly estimate the contact rate  in the ML, changes in the functional form of
the matching function do not aect the estimation process. Therefore, as we also estimate
the threshold xr directly, the right hand side of equation (18) is completely determined by
the values obtained in the estimation process.17 Accordingly, the left hand side must remain
constant as we change the elasticity of q. Therefore, we cannot use this device to identify the
matching function elasticity, instead we set it to 0.5, the average of what is usually found in
the literature. In particular we use q() =  1=2.
5.4 Results
By xing the discount rate at 5% annually and the workers bargaining power  at 0.3, we
obtain the following ML estimates for each subsample.18 Results are presented in Table 4.
The estimate of the drift  of the productivity process implies that productivity increases
by around 0.7% per month for the lowest eduction groups and at 0.8% for the most educated,
which implies that wages increase rapidly with tenure for all groups and that they do it faster
for those with more education.19On the other hand, the small estimate for productivity
dispersion  across subsamples, implies that productivity grows almost deterministically,
and thus, endogenous destruction is not a common event, the implied income volatility and
number of separations being higher for those with the lowest education. Simulations give
us some insight on these low estimates: larger levels of 's imply levels of wage dispersion
across tenure that we do not observe in our subsamples; in particular, the implied dispersion
of wages corresponding to longer employment spells is much larger than what we observe.
However, we do observe a fair amount of dispersion in our data, which is captured by the
sampling distribution; consistent with our data, the mean and dispersion implied by  and 
17As changes in the elasticity do change the equilibrium value of the market tightness , it may seem
unintuitive that wages do not change as well. The reason is that wages depend on  only through the value of
unemployment U. As we estimate xr and  directly, U is determined once we have the estimates. Therefore,
changing the elasticity changes c and , but does not aect U, wages or prots.
18A value of of 0.3 for  is an upper bound to the estimates found in the literature (see Cahuc et al.
(2006) or Yashiv (2003)).
19Notice though that r+1 +2   > 0 for all groups, and therefore, the agents' problem is well dened,
that is, their maximization problems do not diverge.
23Table 4: Estimates for Education Subsample
Sample
Parameter Education 1 Education 2 Education 3
 0.096 0.094 0.101
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
1 0.009 0.010 0.009
(1e-4) (1e-5) (6e-6)
2 0.012 0.012 0.011
(1e-4) (2e-5) (2e-5)
xr 0.725 0.752 0.701
(1e-7) (1e-4) (9e-4)
 0.007 0.007 0.008
(1e-4) (9e-6) (1e-6)
 0.024 0.001 0.005
(4e-6) (8e-7) (9e-4)
 0.488 1.023 1.143
(1e-6) (3e-4) (1e-5)
 0.038 0.169 1.005
(2e-8) (3e-4) (0.045)
ME 0.512 0.582 0.115
(2e-4) (0.008) (3e-6)
 1.723 1.099 1.344
(0.027) (0.007) (0.013)
ln L -15891.5 -50243.0 -16479.5
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
are increasing in the education level. So, most of the observed wage dispersion is explained
by the model as luck in matching when leaving unemployment. Additionally, due to the lack
of job-to-job transitions in our model, the high wages at low tenure we nd in our data set
can only be explained by a high initial productivity.
The estimate for the contact rate  implies that, on average, unemployed workers from the
two lowest education groups receive a wage oer every 10 and a half months, which is almost
half the frequency found by Prat (forthcoming) using United States data. This frequency for
those with the highest education is 9.9 months. The implied unemployment duration is 10.4
months for those in Education 1 and 10.6 for the others, which is exactly what we found in
the data. These estimates imply that virtually all contacts result in matches. The resulting
unemployment rate is near 18% for all subsamples.
The estimates for the Poisson rates 1 and 2 are very stable across subsamples, capturing
24Table 5: Estimates of Remaining Parameters and Equilibrium Values
Sample
Parameter Education 1 Education 2 Education 3
Vacancy Cost
c 457.0 1108.3 1935.9
(15.7) (29.4) (156.8)
Search Cost
s 2.66 5.19 9.66
(0.016) (0.287) (0.715)
Flow Vacancy Cost in Wages
c
(1 G(xr))q() ! 40.0 82.6 75.8
Market Tightness
 0.009 0.009 0.010
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
precisely the probabilities of receiving severance payments we see in our data: 41%, 48%
and 46% for Education 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The dispersion of the measurement error
implied by the estimates ME is much smaller for those more educated, thus, if measurement
error derives from incorrect reporting, this entails that the information provided by workers
in Education 3 is more accurate. Finally, the maximized log likelihood is much smaller for
the Education 2 sample, but this dierence can be explained by the dierences in sample
size. The samples for groups 1 and 3 are very similar (3062 and 2708, respectively), while
Education 2 has almost three times more observations (8800).
To assess the t of the model to the data, Figure 2 presents in its upper panel simulations
of the density of wages above the minimum wage for ongoing employment spells (upper left)
and of the duration density of such spells (upper right), for Education 2. The bottom panels
represent the corresponding densities found in the data. Both simulated densities are a
smoother version of the one found in the data, and even though the fatter tail of duration
observed in the data is not captured in the model, the general shapes of the wages and
durations distributions are.20
The corresponding equilibrium market tightness and the other parameters that we back
up from equilibrium restrictions are presented in Table 5. On average, the ow cost of
a vacancy is 40 times the average wage in the labor market composed of those with less
education, and around 80 for the other two groups. In relative terms, these results are
20The same conclusions are reached for Education 1 and Education 3, plots are not presented
25Figure 2: Hourly wages and duration of ongoing employment spells (in months): simulation (top panels)
vs. data (bottom panels). The simulations consist of 100,000 random draws, using the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm, from the respective densities implied by the model.
intuitive in the sense that it is more expensive to hire more skilled workers, however, these
ow costs are extremely high21. The vacancy cost c is computed from the free entry condition,
which equates it to the ex-ante expected prots of rms. These high expected prots have at
least two possible explanations: the high dispersion of wages we observe from the data and
the low share of the surplus we assume workers receive. Dierences in wages are captured
by the model as dierences in match quality, thus, the high dispersion we nd in the wage
data together with the low workers' share, translates into a distribution of rms values with
a high dispersion. Since the value of a rm is bound below by zero, high dispersion implies
that expected prots must be high. In fact, when reestimating the model with a higher
workers' share, c drops signicantly.
The low estimates of market tightness are consistent with the high unemployment rate
implied by all estimate sets. Our results indicate that the high estimated unemployment
21The literature imply that a reasonable range for the expected recruiting cost per vacancy is from 9% of
the average monthly wages up to 42% (see Toledo and Silva (2005), Abowd and Kramarz (2003))
26rate is the product of long unemployment (which mimics exactly what we observe in the
data), rather than of a high incidence of unemployment, and therefore, due to few vacancies.
These few vacancies and high unemployment rate explains the very low market tightness.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
As we mentioned previously, there are two important issues regarding our sample. First,
around half of the individuals in our sample contribute with more than one spell. As we
can expect to nd individual eects, using spells belonging to the same individual could
violate the independence assumption of ML. Second, our sample encompasses 17 years, each
with a dierent minimum wage. This may defy our stationarity assumption. To test how
our estimates are aected by these two facts, we re-estimate the model with two dierent
restrictions on our subsamples. To control for the unobserved individual eects, we construct
a new sample (Sample Bi) by randomly selecting one spell from each individual in Education
i (Sample Ai) for i 2 f1;2;3g. As discussed previously, the ratio of the minimum wage to
the average wage remained fairly stable over the 2002-2007 period (Figure 1). Therefore, to
control for both issues, for each subsample, we build a third sample (Sample Ci) by randomly
choosing one spell per individual from the set of spells active in 2002 and spells that began
after 2002.
The estimates from the sensitivity analysis are all precisely estimated, Tables 6, 7 and 8
show the results for Education 1, 2 and 3, respectively. For all education levels, when going
from Sample Ai to Sample Bi, and from Sample Bi to Sample Ci, the estimates imply that
the unemployment rate decreases, that employment spells are longer, and expected produc-
tivity is higher. Two possible explanations are the following. First, as higher skilled people
within each education group tend to have more and better (in terms of wages and dura-
tion) employment spells, whereas low skilled workers transit more through unemployment,
in Samples Bi and Ci employment spells with higher wages and that last longer, as well as
long unemployment spells, are over represented. Second, at least part of the changes found
when going from Sample Bi to Sample Ci, are due to the fact that the period 2002-2007 is
characterized by higher average real wages (real wages had steadily increased since 1990).
Since we do not observe dramatic changes in the estimates, and general trends can be
explained, these results suggest that individual eects and non-stationary changes in the
minimum wage do not have signicant impacts on estimates and support our decision of not
discarding data.
27Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis Results for Education 1
Parameter Full Sample (A1) One Spell (B1) One Spell Since 2002 (C1)
 0.096 0.092 0.094
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
1 0.009 0.007 0.005
(1e-4) (2e-4) (3e-5)
2 0.012 0.011 0.010
(1e-4) (1e-4) (1e-5)
xr 0.725 0.742 0.708
(1e-7) (4e-5) (1e-4)
 0.007 0.005 0.006
(1e-4) (7e-6) (3e-4)
 0.024 0.021 0.015
(4e-6) (2e-6) (1e-4)
 0.488 0.517 0.406
(1e-6) (0.040) (2e-6)
 0.038 0.030 0.095
(2e-8) (0.006) (0.032)
ME 0.512 0.523 0.526
(2e-4) (0.018) (0.016)
 1.723 1.696 1.806
(0.027) (0.019) (0.015)
ln L -15891.5 -10109.9 -7861.3
Number Obs. 3062 1947 1545
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
28Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis Results for Education 2
Parameter Full Sample (A2) One Spell (B2) One Spell Since 2002 (C2)
 0.094 0.086 0.092
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1 0.010 0.009 0.007
(1e-5) (1e-4) (1e-4)
2 0.012 0.009 0.008
(2e-5) (6e-5) (2e-4)
xr 0.752 0.717 0.661
(1e-4) (3e-5) (1e-4)
 0.007 0.007 0.006
(9e-6) (1e-4) (3e-7)
 0.001 0.002 0.020
(8e-7) (1e-4) (1e-4)
 1.023 0.995 1.082
(3e-4) (2e-4) (1e-4)
 0.169 0.210 0.021
(3e-4) (0.039) (0.011)
ME 0.582 0.568 0.584
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
 1.099 1.119 1.050
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
ln L -50243.0 -27532.6 -23269.3
Number Obs. 8800 4703 3807
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
29Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis Results for Education 3
Parameter Full Sample (A3) One Spell (B3) One Spell Since 2002 (C3)
 0.101 0.099 0.100
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
1 0.009 0.008 0.007
(6e-6) (8e-5) (7e-6)
2 0.011 0.010 0.007
(2e-5) (8e-5) (1e-5)
xr 0.701 0.628 0.591
(9e-4) (9e-4) (2e-6)
 0.008 0.008 0.008
(1e-6) (1e-4) (4e-7)
 0.005 0.013 0.003
(9e-4) (0.001) (0.001)
 1.143 1.098 1.213
(1e-5) (0.043) (0.040)
 1.005 0.977 0.947
(0.045) (0.040) (0.032)
ME 0.115 0.942 0.087
(3e-6) (0.012) (0.014)
 1.344 1.342 1.301
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013)
ln L -16479.5 -9358.5 - 8127.6
Number Obs. 2708 1481 1201
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
306 Welfare Analysis
In perfectly competitive models, labor market policies, such as minimum wages and severance
payments, distort the agents' behavior, leading to inecient outcomes. On the other hand,
in models with frictions that prevent the economy from reaching the socially ecient second-
best outcome, policies can be used as third-best tools for reaching the constrained ecient
allocation and be welfare-improving. In particular, in models with search frictions, if rents are
not being distributed \appropriately" between the rm and the worker, then labor market
policies can have a positive role. When contact rates depend on market tightness, and
market tightness depends on wages, congestion externalities arise when negotiating agents
do not take into account that their decision will aect searching workers and rms. The
appropriate wage internalizes such externalities. Hosios (1990) showed that in a search
model where homogenous rms and workers meet according to a CRS matching function,
and where wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining, the equilibrium allocation
is ecient if the share of the surplus that workers receive is equal to the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to the unemployed. In such settings, if the share of workers is
too low, then labor market policies can increase the \eective" share of workers and improve
aggregate welfare.
Our setting has match-specic heterogeneity that leads to endogenous creation and de-
struction. Pissarides (2000) extends Hosios' result to models with endogenous creation and
to models with endogenous destruction where productivity jumps after being hit by a shock.
We introduce the destruction margin in our setting by letting productivity continuously uc-
tuate, leading to a non-degenerate equilibrium distribution of productivity. Thus, to nd the
economy's second-best allocation, that is, the allocation (xr;) chosen by a planner that max-
imizes aggregate welfare subject to frictions, we must keep this resulting multi-dimensional
object as a state variable. Therefore, we are not able to analytically nd the second-best
allocation for our setting, nor to determine analytically whether Hosios' result holds or not.
The same innite-dimensional state variable appears in the dynamic optimization problem
faced when solving the economy's third-best, that is, when looking for the policy levels that
maximize welfare subject to frictions and equilibrium conditions. Given that the described
technical diculty in solving the planner's dynamic optimization problem also applies to
its numerical solution (because of the dimensionality curse), they will be subject of future
research, and here we present an analysis of steady state welfare.
We use the three sets of estimates obtained previously to determine the impact on the
labor market of counterfactual changes in policies. As before, we treat the three labor
markets as completely separate. We assume that the parameters of the model are invariant to
changes in policies, and we study the impact of this change on equilibrium and welfare. Our
31utilitarian welfare measure is, as in Hosios (1990), the sum of the average values of the agents
in the labor market, weighted by their measure in the economy. As discussed, we maximize
steady state welfare with respect to policy menus, subject to frictional unemployment and
equilibrium conditions: the free entry condition, the formula for the value of unemployment,
the equation for the cuto xr derived from the rm's boundary and optimality conditions,
and the equation for the cuto xm.22 Thus, we solve the following steady state problem:
max













and equations (9), (16), (17), (18)
where  G = 1   G, a =
 +
2 with  =
p
 2 + 22 and   =    2=2.
The results of the counterfactual experiments depend critically upon the dierence be-
tween the workers' power  and the matching function elasticity, parameters that we do not
estimate but x. This caveat has to be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
Table 9 presents the results of our counterfactual experiments, with one panel for each
level of education. The rst four columns represent the workers' share, policy levels, and the
implied welfare level, the last three columns present equilibrium variables. We compute all
these variable for ve scenarios: under the current levels of policies; the optimum when only
one policy is available: severance payments (second row) or minimum wage (third row); the
optimum when both policies can be used; and nally, we set the policy levels to zero and
look for the optimal workers' share . Note that for the rst four cases  is xed at the
value we used for the estimation, 0.3.
Intuitively, the introduction of a continuously evolving productivity should not aect,
at least directly, the channel by which the decisions of meeting rms and workers have an
impact on searching agents. Therefore, we would expect Hosios' result to hold in our setting.
If that were the case, then we should have that the level of dynamic welfare (that is, the one
considering transitional dynamics from one steady state to the other) reached when setting
 equal to the matching function elasticity (0.5) and without policies, is the maximum level
of dynamic welfare that can be attained in the economy (with or without policies). Now,
as we are considering only steady state welfare in a setting with positive discounting, and
thus neglecting welfare during the transitional path, we cannot expect Hosios to hold. To
22The steps for the derivation of the unemployment rate are given in the Appendix
32Table 9: Welfare Analysis Results
Education 1
Case  m  welfare xr  G(xr)
Estimated 0.3 1.0 1.7 172.3 0.725 0.009 0.0000
Optimum Only SP 0.3 - 7.7 174.3 0.307 0.007 0.0000
Optimum Only m 0.3 1.18 - 174.3 0.845 0.007 0.0000
Optimum Combined 0.3 multiple 174.3 multiple
m =  = 0, max on  0.47 - - 174.3 0.244 0.007 0.0000
Education 2
Case  m  welfare xr  G(xr)
Estimated 0.3 1.0 1.1 127.1 0.752 0.009 0.0000
Optimum Only SP 0.3 - 8.8 145.3 0 0.005 0.0000
Optimum Only m 0.3 1.7 - 145.3 1.266 0.005 0.0000
Optimum Combined 0.3 multiple 145.3 multiple
m =  = 0, max on  0.47 - - 145.3 0 0.005 0.0000
Education 3
Case  m  welfare xr  G(xr)
Estimated 0.3 1.0 1.3 469.9 0.701 0.010 0.0681
Optimum Only SP 0.3 - 9.5 504.9 0.499 0.006 0.0338
Optimum Only m 0.3 2.6 - 501.8 1.790 0.008 0.2886
Optimum Combined 0.3 1.9 7.6 528.3 1.387 0.006 0.2086
m =  = 0, max on  0.47 - - 500.9 0.381 0.006 0.0180
assess the deviation from Hosios when using steady state welfare, in the last experiment we
maximize steady state welfare on  in a policy-free environment. We nd that for the three
education levels, in the absence of policies, the maximum steady state welfare is reached
under  = 0:47, instead of 0.5. Therefore, there is not a signicant deviation from the result
we would expect if we were considering the dynamic welfare. We refer to the welfare on the
last row of each panel as -welfare.
We nd that both policies can improve welfare in each of the three cases, and that
the maximum increase is 1.2%, 12.6% and 11.1% for Education 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
For Education 1 and 2, -welfare is the highest welfare that can be reached. Therefore,
similarly to Hosios' result, no policy can improve steady state welfare when the workers'
share is at an appropriate value, however, that value is no longer the elasticity but a slightly
smaller one. Additionally, for the two education groups, the maximum welfare can also be
33implemented using either policy by itself: by incrementing the minimum wage 18% or the
severance payments coecient by 4.5 times for the least educated ones, and by increasing
the minimum wage 70% or multiplying  by eight for those in the middle group.23The last
three columns of Table 9 present the implied equilibrium for each menu of policies. We
concentrate our analysis on the values of the productivity cuto xr and the market tightness
, because once these are given, equilibrium equations pin down the values for the rest of
the equilibrium variables. When the workers' share is too low, labor is cheap and rms
create too many vacancies, implying a relatively large market tightness. The introduction of
policies can increase the workers' \eective" share and improve welfare. The seventh column
of Table 9 shows the equilibrium market tightness for the cases under study. In the rst two
panels, we see that market tightness has the same value in all of the cases where maximum
welfare is reached, 0.007 for the least educated and 0.005 for the middle education group;
whereas the cuto xr diers greatly, however, these dierences are not signicant in terms
of their impact on the equilibrium turnover. In fact, in terms of the creation decision, the
estimates for the parameters of the initial productivity draw ( and ) imply that, under
these cutos, almost all matches are created (the accumulation of these thresholds is shown
in column 8 of Table 9). Second, as we discussed previously, given the small variance of the
productivity process, once a match is created, changes in xr have almost no impact on job
destruction. Therefore, even though these xr have signicant magnitude dierences, their
impact on equilibrium outcomes is very similar.
Additionally, for these two sets of parameters, severance payments and the minimum wage
are perfect substitutes. Let m
i and 
i , for i 2 f1;2g, be the levels of the minimum wage and
severance payments that reach the maximum welfare for Education 1 and 2, respectively. In
terms of the combined optimum, in both Education 1 and 2, for any  m < m
i there exists
  < 
i such that the maximum level of welfare is attained under the policy menu ( m;  ),
and vice versa.
The results for Education 3 no longer mimic Hosios' result. In fact, -welfare is 6.2%
larger than current welfare, yet steady state welfare could increase more than 10% if the
appropriate policies were implemented. Even more, now the maximum level of welfare can
not be reached using only one policy, both must be implemented; and the level of welfare
that can be attained using only severance payments is higher than that obtained imposing
only a minimum wage.24
Analyzing the equilibrium impacts of severance payments and minimum wage helps foster
23For sake of clarity, hereafter, I will refer to the severance payments coecient just as severance payments
or .
24As was discussed before, deviations from Hosios' result are expected when comparing steady state
welfare in an environment with a positive discounting rate. Thus, this result does not imply that Hosios
does not hold in our setting.
34our understanding of why severance payments are a better tool in the case of Education 3.
Given our estimates, the minimum wage and severance payments have the same qualitative
impact on equilibrium. An increase in any of the two policies implies a decrease in market
tightness and an increase in the productivity cuto. The relative eectiveness of severance
payments can be explained by the rate at which such trade-o occurs. First note that a big
dierence between the results for Education 3 and those for Education 1 and 2, is that for
the latter, almost all matches are created, whereas for Education 3, in each case, there is a
signicant amount of matches that do not lead to production, highly educated workers are
\picky". Therefore, getting the cuto xr correctly is now important. Since minimum wages
have a relatively stronger eect at the bottom of the wage distribution and a weak eect
on higher wages, they aect the creation/destruction cuto in a particularly strong way, as
compared to its eect on vacancy creation. On the other hand, severance payments have
a proportional eect across the wage distribution, which enables them to change market
tightness without leading to an extremely large threshold for productivity. From the fourth
row of the last panel of Table 9 we can see that the pair (xr;) that leads to maximum
welfare is (1:387;0:006); the optimal severance payment of 9.5 (second row) implement the
optimal tightness, however it can not reach the maximum welfare because the implied cuto
is around a third the optimal one. On the other hand, the optimal minimum wage equal
to 2.6 (third row) is not able to implement the optimal tightness nor the optimal cuto:
lowering the current tightness of 0.010 to 0.008 already implies a cuto 30% larger than the
optimal one. However, these two policies can complement each other: smaller levels of both
policies, m = 1:9 and  = 7:6, can be combined to raise the productivity level enough and,
at the same time, aect the rest of the wage distribution signicantly.
Just like an increase in the severance payments coecient , an increase in the worker
bargaining power  impacts wages linearly in productivity, therefore it is not surprising that
there is no level of  that implements the maximum welfare in the absence of policies: the
optimal rate of vacancy creation can be implemented, however too many matches lead to
production.
An important question is what makes Education 3 dierent from the other two subsam-
ples. An answer, from a simple inspection of the data, is wage dispersion; wage dispersion
in Education 3 is twice the one found in Education 2 and around 4 times the one from Edu-
cation 1. To test how wage dispersion aects welfare results, we computed optimal welfare
(for each of the four last cases in Table 9) for the set of estimates from Education 3 but
xing the shape parameter  of the sampling distribution at dierent levels. As a reference,
the estimate for  equals 0.038, 0.169 and 1.005 for Education 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We
nd that for  = 0:1, the welfare results are qualitative analogous to those for Education 1
and 2: the maximum welfare reached in each case is the same. For  2 f0:3;0:5g, severance
35payments are able to attain the level of welfare reached under no policy and  = 0:47, how-
ever, the minimum wage by itself is already not able to reach the maximum level of welfare.
Finally, for  2 f0:7;0:9g, the use of policies can lead to welfare higher than that reached
under no policy and  = 0:47.
7 Conclusions
We structurally estimate the parameters of the labor market model presented in Section 3
with data on employment histories from Chile, a country where labor market regulations
prescribe high severance payments and minimum wage. We use the Social Protection Survey,
from where we draw up to 16 years of longitudinal information in relation to labor market
histories for each individual. With these estimates, we perform counterfactual experiments
that allow us to answer questions about optimal policy combinations. Since we do not
control for ex-ante heterogeneity in our model, we estimate the model for three subsamples
corresponding to dierent levels of workers' education, assuming that each group belongs to
a completely separate labor market.
Our welfare analysis results depend critically on the dierence between the workers' share
 of the surplus they generate and the elasticity  of the matching function. As our data set
does not permit us to estimate those parameters, we x them, which implies the drawback
that our welfare results are conditional on the chosen values.25
We conclude that the level of wage dispersion of the sample is a critical factor in deter-
mining the optimal policy menu. When the dispersion in wages is low and the share that
workers receive from the surplus their job generates equals the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to the size of the set of unemployed, the economy's maximum wel-
fare level is reached in a policy-free environment; on the other hand, if the workers' share
is below the elasticity, the maximum level of welfare can be attained using any of the fol-
lowing three possibilities: severance payments or a minimum wage by themselves or with
an appropriate combination of these two policies. In all these cases, it is optimal to create
almost all matches, and any creation threshold that accumulates almost no initial draws
is enough (with the appropriate market tightness, of course). However, when productivity
rises, for a signicant fraction of matches it is optimal that rms keep looking for better
draws instead of producing. In this way, as dispersion in wages increases, the strong eect
of the minimum wage at the bottom of the wage distribution makes it impossible to attain
25With adequate data, our estimation procedure can easily be extended to estimate  and . In particular,
if employer-employee data were available, the workers' share could be estimated using a method similar to
that of Cahuc et al. (2006). With data on vacancy rates, together with estimates for the contact rate  and
the unemployment rate, we would be able to estimate one parameter for the matching function. None of
this additional data is publicly available for the Chilean labor market.
36the precise job creation cuto, and thus it can not implement the economy's maximum level
of welfare. Even more, when the dispersion in wages is high enough, as the one observed in
the subsample with higher education level, for any level of the workers' share, no policy in
isolation can attain the economy's maximum level of welfare, and a particular combination
of labor market policies is required.
37Appendix
A Derivation of Conditional Likelihood Contributions
We use the same notation given in Section 4, repeated for easier access
Ti = time of arrival of the rst exogenous shock i, i = 1;2. Let fi be its pdf, and Fi its cdf.
Tr = minft > 0jXt = xrg. Let fr be its pdf, and Fr its cdf.
te = minfT1;T2;Trg, that is, duration of completed employment spells.
Where,
fi(t) = ie
 it i = 1;2
Fi(t) = 1   e
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where  is standard Normal cumulative distribution function and x0 is the initial produc-
tivity draw. Finally, from the generalized reection principle we obtain that for  x  xr
P(Tr > t;Xt   x)
= 
































































38All formulas in this section are for a given x0 and to derive the general expression we
must integrate out with respect to x0. For ease of notation we omit that integral from what
follows.
A.1 Contribution of Ongoing Employment Spells
The ergodic joint distribution of tenure and wages implied by the model can be explicitly
computed. We rst compute the joint density of tenure T and productivity  x and then we
use the change of variable formula to obtain the corresponding joint density of tenure and
wages.
For  x  xr
P(te > T;XT   x) = P(Tr > T;T1 > T;T2 > T;XT   x)
=  F1(T)  F2(T)P(Tr > T;XT   x)
where  F = 1 F. We then derive this expression (using equation (20)) to obtain the density
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Dening A(T;  x) as


























f(T;  x) = A(T;  x)  F1(T)  F2(T)
To obtain the population joint density of tenure and productivity, we must multiply the
density f by the job creation rate, which in steady state is given by u  G(xr). To derive the






Then, unemployment can be derived from the steady state ow equation,







0(xr)   u  G(xr)
which states that the ows in and out of unemployment are equal. The inow from employ-
39ment has two sources, exogenous destruction at rate , and endogenous destruction caused
by productivity crossing the threshold xr (term captured by 1
22x2
rv0(xr)). Outow from














2 with  =
p
 2 + 22 and   =    2=2.
The population density of wages and tenure for an ongoing spell is given by the density
f multiplied by the job creation rate. To obtain the probability density, we must normalize
this population density by 1 u. Finally, using the change of variable formula, the resulting







A(t;x(w))  F1(t)  F2(t)
+(r+2 ) w > m
u  G(xr)
1 u  F1(t)  F2(t)
R xr
xm A(t;x)dx w = m
For spells with only tenure information, we integrate the joint density with respect to
wages to obtain their likelihood contribution.
A.2 Contribution of Unemployment Spells
Since the population unemployment spell duration distribution is an exponential, the density
of completed unemployment spells of length t as well as that of ongoing unemployment spells
of length t in the steady state are given by   G(xr)exp   G(xr).
A.3 Contribution of Completed Employment Spells without Wage
Information
Let us rst compute the likelihood contribution of a complete employment spell with only
tenure information.
Pfte  tg = 1   Pfte  tg
= 1   PfT1  t;T2  t;Tr  tg
= 1   [1   F1(t)][1   F2(t)][1   Fr(t)]
40Thus, letting  F = 1   F, we get that the density is given by
fte(t) = f1(t)  F2(t)  Fr(t) + f2(t)  F1(t)  Fr(t) + fr(t)  F1(t)  F2(t)
The steps to compute the likelihood contribution of a completed employment spell that
ended with the reception of severance payments are the following. Receiving severance
payments is equivalent to being destroyed by a 1 shock, thus
Pfte  t;reception of SPg = Pfte  t;T1 < T2;T1 < Trg












[1   F2(s)][1   Fr(s)]dF1(s)
Therefore the density is given by
gte(t;reception of SP) =  F2(t)  Fr(t)f1(t)
Analogously, for a spell that ended without severance payments we obtain the following
density
gte(t;no reception of SP) = gte(t;T2 < T1 _ Tr < T1)
= fr(t)  F1(t)  F2(t) + f2(t)  F1(t)  Fr(t)
where  F = 1   F.
A.4 Contribution of Completed Employment Spells with Wage
Information
For spells that ended with the reception of severance payments, we rst compute the joint
density of te and productivity, and then we use the change of variable formula to derive the
formula for wages.
41For  x  xr








P(Xs   x;s < Tr)[1   F2(s)]dF1(s)
Then, we get the density for  x  xr from









































where the last equality comes from (20).
Using the denition for A(t;x) and the change of variable formula, we get that the density
of wages and completed spells is:





+(r+2 ) w > m
 F2(t)f1(t)
R xr
xm A(t;x)dx w = m
Similarly, for spells that did not nish with the reception of severance payments,
P(te  t;Xte   x;1 did not arrive rst)
= P(te  t;Xte   x;2 arrived rst _ xrwas reached rst)
= P(te  t;Xte   xj2 arrived rst)P(2 is rst)
+ P(te  t;Xte   xjxr is reached rst)P(xr is reached rst)
42Using the results from the previous section,
P(te  t;Xte   x;2 arrived rst) =
Z t
0
P(Xs   x;s < Tr)  F1(s)dF2(s)
and noting that XTr = xr   x, also from previous results we get that
P(te  t;Xte   x;xr is reached rst) =
Z t
0
 F1(s)  F2(s)dFr(s)
Therefore
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 F1(t)f2(t)  x > xr
 F1(t)  F2(t)fr(t)  x = xr
Then the respective joint density of length of completed employment spells and nal
wages is given by





+(r+2 ) w > m
 F1(t)  F2(t)fr(t) +  F1(t)f2(t)
R xr
xm A(t;x)dx w = m






A(t;x)[f1(t)  F2(t) + f2(t)  F1(t)] x > xr






A(t;x(w))[f1(t)  F2(t)+f2(t)  F1(t)]
+(r+2 0) w > m
 F1(t)  F2(t)fr(t) + [f1(t)  F2(t) + f2(t)  F1(t)]
R xm
xr A(t;x)dx w = m
A.5 Introduction of Measurement Error
We introduce measurement error in observed wages above the minimum wage, such that
!
obs = !
real where   Lognormal(1;ME)
Therefore, we have to apply the change of variable formula once more to every piece of
likelihood evaluated at x(w). If a function f is evaluated at x(w), and possible other variables





!obs=   (1   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where g is the Lognormal density function.
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